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Thursday, April 3, 2014
Sunday, June 30, 2013
Friday, September 3, 2010
back at it
Well, as far as I know there isn't a soul aside from myself who reads anything I write here (all the more likely because I don't really tell anyone that I write stuff), but it's somehow gratifying all the same to write something that shows up in the public domain.
Just back from a year in China. I have more to write about than I could possibly ever have the time or inclination to put down. I think I might start writing a bit more again though. Possibly even with some conscious effort to develop some writing style?
How about something simple to start with.
If I have been impressed by an idea in the last little while, it is this: eradicating world poverty is not such a complicated matter, even in consideration of population growth and environmental concerns associated the rest of the world leaving poverty to the dustbins of history.
It would take a serious pessimist indeed to read "The End of Poverty" by Jeffrey Sachs and "Banker to the Poor" by Muhammad Yunus and not think that eradicating poverty is not only possible, but something that can be attained in our lifetime. By poverty, of course, I mean the kind where you don't eat much, or take the kids out of school at the age of 6 or 10 to help at the family farm.
I mean, if the ultimate goal of our time here is enlightenment, or at least some degree of higher development as a human being, well, how can that be attained by a hungry person who never had a chance to learn much of anything outside of fighting for basic survival? (Of course, hard times may also be a stimulus to personal development as well, but generally through the desire to improve one's economic or social circumstances, rather than an effort at improvement in of and for itself). And how could the rest of us suppose we were much at all further along the way if we did not want to at least put our two cents (or preferably dollars) into enabling others to do the same? Sachs and Yunus have convinced me that some degree of optimism on this front is very much warranted.
Leave the brutish and short life to the animals. Let us welcome the remainder of homo sapiens to join humanity in the fullest potential that can be made of it.
Just back from a year in China. I have more to write about than I could possibly ever have the time or inclination to put down. I think I might start writing a bit more again though. Possibly even with some conscious effort to develop some writing style?
How about something simple to start with.
If I have been impressed by an idea in the last little while, it is this: eradicating world poverty is not such a complicated matter, even in consideration of population growth and environmental concerns associated the rest of the world leaving poverty to the dustbins of history.
It would take a serious pessimist indeed to read "The End of Poverty" by Jeffrey Sachs and "Banker to the Poor" by Muhammad Yunus and not think that eradicating poverty is not only possible, but something that can be attained in our lifetime. By poverty, of course, I mean the kind where you don't eat much, or take the kids out of school at the age of 6 or 10 to help at the family farm.
I mean, if the ultimate goal of our time here is enlightenment, or at least some degree of higher development as a human being, well, how can that be attained by a hungry person who never had a chance to learn much of anything outside of fighting for basic survival? (Of course, hard times may also be a stimulus to personal development as well, but generally through the desire to improve one's economic or social circumstances, rather than an effort at improvement in of and for itself). And how could the rest of us suppose we were much at all further along the way if we did not want to at least put our two cents (or preferably dollars) into enabling others to do the same? Sachs and Yunus have convinced me that some degree of optimism on this front is very much warranted.
Leave the brutish and short life to the animals. Let us welcome the remainder of homo sapiens to join humanity in the fullest potential that can be made of it.
Saturday, June 27, 2009
Self definition
Everything one does has elements of self definition, even when acquiescing to social norms and/or power structures that define a set of rules that we must work within (since one may either choose not to oppose them or make their decisions in accordance with these norms or structures). If that acquiescence is purely intentional, then one may very well have the capacity to self definition without needing to diverge from norms.
Although social convention may tend to act somewhat against self definition in the strictest sense, it is also a required context for identity since, as social beings, we ultimately define ourselves in relation to our own community and other communities. After all, what sort of genuine individuality could be expressed by defining oneself in comparison to a monkey? We define ourselves in comparison to, and in contradiction to, other humans.
Economic factors may exclude some people from self definition if they must spend all their time working for basic survival and have no remaining energy to explore their being as a creative and thinking entity.
Trying to define self definition is, truly, a self-defeating thing to try to do, since it would suppose that some individual could understand what that would mean for each person. It would refer to things that are contingent on one’s own passions, sense of rationality, and their current context and past experiences.
Being influenced or guided by social convention is not in itself a bad thing. Being aware of the ways in which we are shaped by our social circumstance allows us to be more intentional about how we choose to define our own social, political and economic context. Many people read Foucault and decide to reject the social and political power structures or regimes that they face in society. I do not think this is what he was trying to do. I think he was trying to make us more aware of them so we contemplate how to maintain our capacity to self definition without compromising our willingness to play an active role in maintaining the practical economic benefits offered by being a part of a society where people respect rules and conventions.
The capacity to self definition could arguably be the ideal goal of democratic ideals. This is certainly more meaningful than the principle of 50% +1 majoritarian principles, although they do tend to be a convenient shortcut to making some kinds of decisions.
In short, the possibility of genuine spiritual and economic freedom may exist even when bound by sets of rules and conventions that shape one’s daily decisions. That scope of potentiality, however, generally only exists when the individual’s ability to participate in efforts to shape those very rules and conventions is presumed to be a legitimate and desirable use of one’s spiritual, political and economic self.
Although social convention may tend to act somewhat against self definition in the strictest sense, it is also a required context for identity since, as social beings, we ultimately define ourselves in relation to our own community and other communities. After all, what sort of genuine individuality could be expressed by defining oneself in comparison to a monkey? We define ourselves in comparison to, and in contradiction to, other humans.
Economic factors may exclude some people from self definition if they must spend all their time working for basic survival and have no remaining energy to explore their being as a creative and thinking entity.
Trying to define self definition is, truly, a self-defeating thing to try to do, since it would suppose that some individual could understand what that would mean for each person. It would refer to things that are contingent on one’s own passions, sense of rationality, and their current context and past experiences.
Being influenced or guided by social convention is not in itself a bad thing. Being aware of the ways in which we are shaped by our social circumstance allows us to be more intentional about how we choose to define our own social, political and economic context. Many people read Foucault and decide to reject the social and political power structures or regimes that they face in society. I do not think this is what he was trying to do. I think he was trying to make us more aware of them so we contemplate how to maintain our capacity to self definition without compromising our willingness to play an active role in maintaining the practical economic benefits offered by being a part of a society where people respect rules and conventions.
The capacity to self definition could arguably be the ideal goal of democratic ideals. This is certainly more meaningful than the principle of 50% +1 majoritarian principles, although they do tend to be a convenient shortcut to making some kinds of decisions.
In short, the possibility of genuine spiritual and economic freedom may exist even when bound by sets of rules and conventions that shape one’s daily decisions. That scope of potentiality, however, generally only exists when the individual’s ability to participate in efforts to shape those very rules and conventions is presumed to be a legitimate and desirable use of one’s spiritual, political and economic self.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
to meat or not to meat. Is it natural?
I just read an article on Alternet that claims that eating meat is not natural. I'm not a meat eater, and sincerely believe that steering clear of the stuff is a much better way to live one's life. In any case, this is what I had to say about the article, which was riddled with half truths bordering on falsehoods.
To start with:
- eating meat IS natural. Humans are designed expressly to be able to eat either meat or other types of products. Hence being called omnivores, not herbivores. This is the same argument that I make when people try to tell me it's natural to eat meat. That's wrong too. It's natural to be able to do one or the other, and we have the choice.
- access to protein is a key ingredient for growth. When we started to hunt, we got the ability to access concentrated packets of protein. (We can now do so by cultivating plants with a high concentration of protein.) Getting so much bang for your buck in terms of protein would have been a huge advantage for any group of early humans who learned to hunt, since they could grow bigger and faster, and out-compete their neighbours (until farming came along, of course, which is arguably much less "natural" than eating meat).
- animals that eat plant products have long digestive systems because it takes so long for our enzymes to act on plant materials to be able to digest them. The logic of the argument that carnivores have short intestines to get rid of toxins quickly is back-asswards. Carnivores have short intestinal systems because, after chewing, meat degrades and can be digested quickly (not to dispel rotting flesh quickly.) This has been proven by comparative physiology that looks at the concentration of nitrogen (read protein) and materials that are hard to digest, such as cellulose, in animals diets, compared with properties of animal digestive systems. We need long digestive systems to be able to digest plants, not the other way around (although there are many more specifics to the story).
- also, the idea of bringing heart disease and cancer related to meat eating into an evolutionary argument is a joke. Heart disease and cancer, especially when correlated with meat eating, generally affect people well after their child bearing years, and therefore has limited (if any) relevance to an evolutionary argument.
- our hands may not be designed to tear flesh, but our opposable thumb is designed to make and use tools that do the job for us, while our large brain can figure out how best to close in for the kill. As such, the argument that our difficulty of shredding prey with our bare hands is evidence that eating meat is unnatural bears little relation to our biological and social evolution as humans.
Finally, I do believe that the vegetarian diet, if it follows some basic principles of variety, can be far more healthy than a diet that includes meat.
Eating meat is perfectly natural, but so is not eating meat, but given the health complications of eating meat and incredible inefficiency of producing protein in the form of meat, the choice not to do so is better for both us and the planet.
To start with:
- eating meat IS natural. Humans are designed expressly to be able to eat either meat or other types of products. Hence being called omnivores, not herbivores. This is the same argument that I make when people try to tell me it's natural to eat meat. That's wrong too. It's natural to be able to do one or the other, and we have the choice.
- access to protein is a key ingredient for growth. When we started to hunt, we got the ability to access concentrated packets of protein. (We can now do so by cultivating plants with a high concentration of protein.) Getting so much bang for your buck in terms of protein would have been a huge advantage for any group of early humans who learned to hunt, since they could grow bigger and faster, and out-compete their neighbours (until farming came along, of course, which is arguably much less "natural" than eating meat).
- animals that eat plant products have long digestive systems because it takes so long for our enzymes to act on plant materials to be able to digest them. The logic of the argument that carnivores have short intestines to get rid of toxins quickly is back-asswards. Carnivores have short intestinal systems because, after chewing, meat degrades and can be digested quickly (not to dispel rotting flesh quickly.) This has been proven by comparative physiology that looks at the concentration of nitrogen (read protein) and materials that are hard to digest, such as cellulose, in animals diets, compared with properties of animal digestive systems. We need long digestive systems to be able to digest plants, not the other way around (although there are many more specifics to the story).
- also, the idea of bringing heart disease and cancer related to meat eating into an evolutionary argument is a joke. Heart disease and cancer, especially when correlated with meat eating, generally affect people well after their child bearing years, and therefore has limited (if any) relevance to an evolutionary argument.
- our hands may not be designed to tear flesh, but our opposable thumb is designed to make and use tools that do the job for us, while our large brain can figure out how best to close in for the kill. As such, the argument that our difficulty of shredding prey with our bare hands is evidence that eating meat is unnatural bears little relation to our biological and social evolution as humans.
Finally, I do believe that the vegetarian diet, if it follows some basic principles of variety, can be far more healthy than a diet that includes meat.
Eating meat is perfectly natural, but so is not eating meat, but given the health complications of eating meat and incredible inefficiency of producing protein in the form of meat, the choice not to do so is better for both us and the planet.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
the rare I told you so
I'm not usually the kind of person to say "I told you so", especially since it can ring false in hindsight. However, there are a couple of interesting cases that I feel like noting: first has to do with the financial crisis and the second has to do with a topic that is very much related to what I'm working on for my masters' thesis these days.
As for the financial crisis? Well, to my knowledge I was the first candidate for any political party anywhere in the world to state on the record (in a televised debate during which I more or less massacred the French language) that resolving the problems in financial markets would require a coordinated global response in terms of stimulus plans and easing problems in credit markets. (Actually, I am very much NOT a politician, but when offering to volunteer for the Green party before the last election, I was asked to be a candidate). In any case, this was ultimately the action that most governments ended up doing, in some part under pressures from experts at international institutions.
As for my particular area of interest? Well, I'm curious about the relations between violent conflict and agriculture. I happened to read last week that the recent revolution in Madagascar was largely a response to efforts to lease out land to foreign owners. The problem is that this would have pushed farmers off of land that they currently cultivate, but over which they have no secure rights. Somewhat against the primary thrust of what I'm working on was that they engaged in conflict to ensure their property rights, but the idea that the prospect of reduced certainty about tenure can have a vicious feedback cycle still rings through. In fact, the model that I'm working towards would exactly have predicted that the strategy being used in Madagascar would have increased the probability of conflict.
This is especially important because there are a large number of similar deals presently being negotiated. The benefits, of course, are the influx of foreign capital, which are important. But, without addressing the needs and 'rights' of traditional land users, the effects could be colossal. These negotiations will either have to take care of the interests of farmers who will lose their land or look towards moving to a draconian police state to prevent major civil conflict. The question might be: which types of institutions are likely to imply that governments would prefer the first approach to the second? Not exactly what I'm working on right now (which I figured out yesterday how to explain in precisely 12 words), but it is an important question nonetheless.
Anyways, there's an "I told you so" about two huge issues, the second of which is still enormously in play.
As for the financial crisis? Well, to my knowledge I was the first candidate for any political party anywhere in the world to state on the record (in a televised debate during which I more or less massacred the French language) that resolving the problems in financial markets would require a coordinated global response in terms of stimulus plans and easing problems in credit markets. (Actually, I am very much NOT a politician, but when offering to volunteer for the Green party before the last election, I was asked to be a candidate). In any case, this was ultimately the action that most governments ended up doing, in some part under pressures from experts at international institutions.
As for my particular area of interest? Well, I'm curious about the relations between violent conflict and agriculture. I happened to read last week that the recent revolution in Madagascar was largely a response to efforts to lease out land to foreign owners. The problem is that this would have pushed farmers off of land that they currently cultivate, but over which they have no secure rights. Somewhat against the primary thrust of what I'm working on was that they engaged in conflict to ensure their property rights, but the idea that the prospect of reduced certainty about tenure can have a vicious feedback cycle still rings through. In fact, the model that I'm working towards would exactly have predicted that the strategy being used in Madagascar would have increased the probability of conflict.
This is especially important because there are a large number of similar deals presently being negotiated. The benefits, of course, are the influx of foreign capital, which are important. But, without addressing the needs and 'rights' of traditional land users, the effects could be colossal. These negotiations will either have to take care of the interests of farmers who will lose their land or look towards moving to a draconian police state to prevent major civil conflict. The question might be: which types of institutions are likely to imply that governments would prefer the first approach to the second? Not exactly what I'm working on right now (which I figured out yesterday how to explain in precisely 12 words), but it is an important question nonetheless.
Anyways, there's an "I told you so" about two huge issues, the second of which is still enormously in play.
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
how not to find peace - how to travel the world - the real roots of the crisis
Some people have difficulty understanding why the Palestinians are pissed off. Consider the following quote, relating to a piece of legislation that is on the table in Israel at the moment:
"Palestinian Israelis who mark Israel's independence day as their people's nakba (catastrophe) "exploit the democratic and enlightened character of the State of Israel in order to destroy it from within" - and would be punishable under the bill by up to three years in prison."
My question is simple: does this bill reduce or increase the probability that some individual Palestinians will be interested in joining violent militias.
Targeting civilians is always wrong, whether the perpetrator is a suicide bomber or state. I am also quite sympathetic to arguments of Israel's right to self defence. But sorry, when sand is thrown in the eyes of the prospective terrorist, don't be surprised at the results. Palestinians must learn to live with Israeli's as neighbours in their community, at the household and regional level. The converse is clearly the case as well. The bill outlined by the above quote is in no way illustrative of a people who wish to live in peace with their neighbours.
The historical suffering of the Jews is a reality. Let its memory not be abused to justify the suffering of another group of dispossessed people.
____________________________
Some people have sometimes wondered how it is that someone who has never earned more than 20k in any year (typically much less than that) has managed to travel substantial parts of the world before their 30th birthday. Well, it didn't hurt that money from my grandmother almost entirely paid of my student loan after my first year of university, but aside from that ...
The answer is very simple: I don't own a car and am almost completely indifferent to luxury.
________________________________________
Digging deeper into history for factors leading to the present economic crisis ...
Here is the argument - the move to flexible exchange rate regimes in Asia in the 80s and 90s is an important factor to consider when looking to the roots of the current financial crisis. I should explicitly say that this is not an argument against flexible exchange rate systems. I think the benefits outweigh the costs, but the costs may have been overlooked to some extent, due to the effects that they may have when countries look to reduce capital flight exchange rate risks associated with a flexible rate system.
The argument is actually fairly simply. Asian countries move to a flexible exchange rate system. This makes the Asian financial crisis possible because it allows credit market problems to multiply risks under capital flight, because Asian central banks had too little foreign currency on hand to ride through the crisis. After 1998, their strategy to minimize risks of capital flight and speculation under a flexible exchange rate regime was to pile on foreign reserves (especially US dollars). Had Asian central banks not, as a group, bought trillions of dollars worth of US treasury bills and bonds, the low interest rate policy following the 2001-2002 recession would never have worked, since there would not have been enough demand for these bonds at such low rates. Quite importantly, people who are looking for the historical roots of the crisis often look to that extended period of low interest rates as the cause of the subprime crisis because it underpriced risk in US mortgage markets.
Don't see the connection? Let's try it in reverse chronological order this time. The current crisis was largely triggered by the subprime crisis (although it was multiplied by the amount of leverage that financial institutions took out through various forms of derivatives). The subprime crisis was only possible with an extended regime of very low interest rates (although securitization very much exacerbated the problem). The extended regime of low interest rates was only possible due to the enormous appetite that Asian central banks had for foreign currency reserves, especially for US dollars. This appetite for foreign reserves was a byproduct of the Asian financial crisis. Especially, the desire to use foreign currency reserves to hold out against the risk of a speculative attack on a currency. Such risks are only possible in a flexible exchange rate regime. Hence, the introduction of flexible exchange rate regimes in Asia as a necessary (although clearly not sufficient) cause for the present global crisis.
Again, this is not an argument against flexible exchange rate regimes. They are a key ingredient for markets to find "efficient" prices. However, the argument does point to the fact that the indirect effects that shifts between exchange rate regimes have on global macroeconomic disequilibria have received rather insufficient attention.
Why is this important? Well, one of the largest issues on the table concerning global macroeconomic disequilibria is China's lack of interest in adopting a flexible exchange rate regime. What would China's optimal holdings of various international currencies be under a flexible exchange rate regime, and how would this affect risk evaluations among other market actors? What are possible long term effects of these decisions?
I don't think that history can precisely repeat itself, but that's not to say that we can't learn a whole lot from it. Let's not rush into a flexible exchange rate regime for the Yuan until central bankers in the world's largest currency areas (US, China, Japan, EU) have had a chance to carry out cooperative analysis of possible long term effects of a fully convertible Yuan.
"Palestinian Israelis who mark Israel's independence day as their people's nakba (catastrophe) "exploit the democratic and enlightened character of the State of Israel in order to destroy it from within" - and would be punishable under the bill by up to three years in prison."
My question is simple: does this bill reduce or increase the probability that some individual Palestinians will be interested in joining violent militias.
Targeting civilians is always wrong, whether the perpetrator is a suicide bomber or state. I am also quite sympathetic to arguments of Israel's right to self defence. But sorry, when sand is thrown in the eyes of the prospective terrorist, don't be surprised at the results. Palestinians must learn to live with Israeli's as neighbours in their community, at the household and regional level. The converse is clearly the case as well. The bill outlined by the above quote is in no way illustrative of a people who wish to live in peace with their neighbours.
The historical suffering of the Jews is a reality. Let its memory not be abused to justify the suffering of another group of dispossessed people.
____________________________
Some people have sometimes wondered how it is that someone who has never earned more than 20k in any year (typically much less than that) has managed to travel substantial parts of the world before their 30th birthday. Well, it didn't hurt that money from my grandmother almost entirely paid of my student loan after my first year of university, but aside from that ...
The answer is very simple: I don't own a car and am almost completely indifferent to luxury.
________________________________________
Digging deeper into history for factors leading to the present economic crisis ...
Here is the argument - the move to flexible exchange rate regimes in Asia in the 80s and 90s is an important factor to consider when looking to the roots of the current financial crisis. I should explicitly say that this is not an argument against flexible exchange rate systems. I think the benefits outweigh the costs, but the costs may have been overlooked to some extent, due to the effects that they may have when countries look to reduce capital flight exchange rate risks associated with a flexible rate system.
The argument is actually fairly simply. Asian countries move to a flexible exchange rate system. This makes the Asian financial crisis possible because it allows credit market problems to multiply risks under capital flight, because Asian central banks had too little foreign currency on hand to ride through the crisis. After 1998, their strategy to minimize risks of capital flight and speculation under a flexible exchange rate regime was to pile on foreign reserves (especially US dollars). Had Asian central banks not, as a group, bought trillions of dollars worth of US treasury bills and bonds, the low interest rate policy following the 2001-2002 recession would never have worked, since there would not have been enough demand for these bonds at such low rates. Quite importantly, people who are looking for the historical roots of the crisis often look to that extended period of low interest rates as the cause of the subprime crisis because it underpriced risk in US mortgage markets.
Don't see the connection? Let's try it in reverse chronological order this time. The current crisis was largely triggered by the subprime crisis (although it was multiplied by the amount of leverage that financial institutions took out through various forms of derivatives). The subprime crisis was only possible with an extended regime of very low interest rates (although securitization very much exacerbated the problem). The extended regime of low interest rates was only possible due to the enormous appetite that Asian central banks had for foreign currency reserves, especially for US dollars. This appetite for foreign reserves was a byproduct of the Asian financial crisis. Especially, the desire to use foreign currency reserves to hold out against the risk of a speculative attack on a currency. Such risks are only possible in a flexible exchange rate regime. Hence, the introduction of flexible exchange rate regimes in Asia as a necessary (although clearly not sufficient) cause for the present global crisis.
Again, this is not an argument against flexible exchange rate regimes. They are a key ingredient for markets to find "efficient" prices. However, the argument does point to the fact that the indirect effects that shifts between exchange rate regimes have on global macroeconomic disequilibria have received rather insufficient attention.
Why is this important? Well, one of the largest issues on the table concerning global macroeconomic disequilibria is China's lack of interest in adopting a flexible exchange rate regime. What would China's optimal holdings of various international currencies be under a flexible exchange rate regime, and how would this affect risk evaluations among other market actors? What are possible long term effects of these decisions?
I don't think that history can precisely repeat itself, but that's not to say that we can't learn a whole lot from it. Let's not rush into a flexible exchange rate regime for the Yuan until central bankers in the world's largest currency areas (US, China, Japan, EU) have had a chance to carry out cooperative analysis of possible long term effects of a fully convertible Yuan.
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